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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 In her opening brief, Denise Nesbitt argued the district court erred in awarding 
restitution for items which were not within the scope of the offense for which she was 
convicted and for which she did not agree to pay restitution as part of her plea 
agreement.  She also argued the district court abused its discretion in determining the 
amount of the restitution award because the State did not introduce sufficient evidence 
regarding either the market value or the replacement cost of the items she allegedly 
stole from the victim.  The State contends the district court in no way erred, but its 
arguments are unpersuasive.  This Court should vacate the district court’s restitution 
order and remand this case to the district court for entry of a restitution award that is 
properly limited in scope, and of an amount that is supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence in the record.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Nesbitt relies upon the statement of facts and course of proceedings 




1. Did the district court err in awarding restitution for items which were not within the 
 scope of the offense for which Ms. Nesbitt was convicted and for which she did 
 not agree to pay restitution?  
 







The District Court Erred In Awarding Restitution For Items Which Were Not Within The 
Scope Of The Offense For Which Ms. Nesbitt Was Convicted And For Which She Did 
Not Agree To Pay Restitution 
 
 The district court erred in awarding restitution for items of jewelry which 
Ms. Nesbitt did not admit to taking from Ms. Buck because these items were beyond the 
scope of the offense for which she was convicted and she did not agree to pay 
restitution for these items as part of her plea agreement. 
Ms. Nesbitt was charged by Information with one count of grand theft, committed 
as follows: 
That the defendant . . . on or about January 1, 2014, to July 31, 2014 . . . 
did wrongfully take personal property, to-wit: jewelry, of a value in excess 
of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) from the owner, Gloria Buck, with the 
intent to deprive another of property and/or appropriate to herself certain 
property of another and/or appropriate to a third person certain property of 
another . . . . 
 
(R., pp.37-38.)  Ms. Nesbitt entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which 
she pled guilty to this offense pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), 
and agreed to pay restitution.  (R., p.41; 9/16/15 Tr., p.11; Ls.13-17.)  At the hearing 
where Ms. Nesbitt entered her guilty plea, her counsel described the offense as follows:  
“Your Honor, between January to October of 2014, there’s allegations by an individual 
named Gloria Buck that while my client was a caregiver in her house that my client 
wrongfully removed jewelry from the house including rings, necklace, and I believe a 
bracelet from the residence, allegations that she intended to deprive them permanently 
from [Ms.] Buck, and that all happened in Idaho.”  (9/6/15 Tr., p.16, Ls.5-12.)  Counsel 
for Ms. Nesbitt stated she was working with the prosecutor “trying to come up with an 
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amount [of restitution]” but no agreement had been reached.  (9/6/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.1-17; 
p.14, Ls.4-7.)   
Ms. Nesbitt always understood the restitution award would be limited in scope to 
the items she admitted to taking from Ms. Buck and pawning for Ms. Buck’s daughter.  
At sentencing, her counsel explained to the district court that Ms. Nesbitt “indicated to 
me that she knows by pleading guilty she’ll be on the hook for some restitution, and 
that’s the restitution that we believe the pawned items would be for that can show a 
direct link to my client.”  (10/29/15 Tr., p.21, Ls.13-17.)  If there is any ambiguity in the 
scope of the restitution Ms. Nesbitt agreed to pay as part of her plea agreement, such 
ambiguity should be resolved in Ms. Nesbitt’s favor as the government ordinarily must 
bear responsibility for any lack of clarity in a plea agreement.  See State v. Nienburg, 
153 Idaho 491, 496 (Ct. App. 2012).  If the prosecutor here believed Ms. Nesbitt agreed 
to pay restitution for items beyond those which she admitted to taking and pawning for 
Ms. Buck’s daughter, then it was incumbent upon the prosecutor to assert that belief at 
the time the district court accepted Ms. Nesbitt’s guilty plea.  See id. at 498. 
The State cites State v. Davis, 156 Idaho 671, 675 (Ct. App. 2014), for the 
proposition that “[b]ecause [Ms.] Nesbitt pled guilty to stealing jewelry from Ms. Buck, 
she was liable for the full value of the stolen property.”  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  But the 
question here is not whether Ms. Nesbitt is liable for the full value of the property she 
stole from Ms. Buck, but whether, in addition to the full value of that property, she is also 
liable for the full value of the additional property Ms. Buck alleges she stole, which 
Ms. Nesbitt never admitted to stealing, and for which she was not convicted.  Davis 
does not address this question.     
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 In Davis, the Court of Appeals considered whether, having pled guilty to grand 
theft by possession of a stolen motorcycle, the defendant should be responsible for all 
the damage to the motorcycle when some portion of that damage was caused by a third 
party to whom the defendant sold the motorcycle.  156 Idaho at 672.  The Court 
considered whether the defendant’s criminal conduct was the proximate cause of all the 
damage to the motorcycle, and concluded it was, because the defendant intended to 
deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the motorcycle, and the 
additional damage caused to the motorcycle by the third party was reasonably 
foreseeable.  Id. at 674-75.  Here, Ms. Nesbitt can only be held responsible for the 
financial loss Ms. Buck suffered as a result of the loss of the jewelry Ms. Nesbitt 
admitted to stealing.  She cannot be responsible for the financial loss Ms. Buck suffered 
as a result of the loss of additional items of jewelry because she was not the proximate 
cause of that loss and that loss was not reasonably foreseeable. 
 The State also relies on State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884 (Ct. App. 2008), but that 
case is inapposite.  (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.)  In Schultz, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that, after it established the defendant’s guilt at trial, the State was not precluded from 
pursuing restitution for unauthorized transactions similar to the ones charged in the 
information, which transactions occurred during the same timeframe and under the 
same criminal theory.  148 Idaho at 886.  The Court held that “restitution is statutorily 
available for all unauthorized transactions [that occurred] as a direct result of 
defendant’s criminal conduct and conviction for grand theft . . . .”  Id. at 887.  But in 
Schultz, the defendant “ma[de] no challenge to the sufficiency of the state’s proof at the 
restitution hearing.”  Id.  That is, the defendant did not contest that she made the 
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unauthorized transactions for which the State sought restitution.  Here, by contrast, 
Ms. Nesbitt has always denied that she took any items of jewelry from Ms. Buck beyond 
those that formed the basis of her guilty plea.  The State never proved that she took any 
additional items from Ms. Buck and the restitution order thus awarded restitution of a 
greater scope than the offense for which she was convicted.  This was error, and the 
restitution order should be vacated by this Court, with instructions that the scope of the 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Determining The Amount Of Restitution 
Because The State Did Not Meet Its Burden Of Proving Either The Market Value Or The 
Replacement Cost Of The Items Of Jewelry Ms. Nesbitt Allegedly Took From Ms. Buck 
 
The district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution in the amount of 
$7,747.80 because it did not act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
choices before it in reaching this amount, and did not reach this amount by an exercise 
of reason.  See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (stating standard for abuse 
of discretion review).  The district court could reasonably have awarded restitution in the 
amount of $700 for the items Ms. Nesbitt admitted to taking and pawning.  If this Court 
concludes there was no error in the scope of the restitution award, then the award 
should be reduced from $7,747.80 to $5,097.28, because this is the only valuation 
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.  The district court abused its discretion 
in awarding restitution based on Ms. Buck’s testimony about the original purchase price 
of her missing jewelry. 
In its brief, the State cites State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 824 (Ct. App. 2010), 
for the proposition that a district court can use an alternative method to determine a 
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restitution amount.  (Resp. Br., p.15.)  Indeed, the Court of Appeals in Lombard affirmed 
the use of a statistical model to determine the amount of restitution to be awarded in a 
case of long-term employee embezzlement, which is a type of case with “inherent 
challenges involving the estimation of the actual stolen amount.”  149 Idaho at 823.  A 
case of jewelry theft is not a type of case with inherent challenges involving the 
estimation of the actual stolen amount.  The State could have presented evidence 
regarding the market value of Ms. Buck’s lost jewelry at the time and place of the crime, 
or the replacement cost of that jewelry.  Such evidence would have provided a sufficient 
basis for the district court to determine the value of the lost jewelry.  See I.C. §18-
2402(11)(a).  But the State did not present that evidence (beyond the insurance award).  
Instead, the State presented testimony from Ms. Buck regarding the original purchase 
price of the various items of jewelry she alleged were stolen from her.  The district court 
abused its discretion in determining the amount of the restitution award based solely on 
this evidence.   
 Even if the district court could determine a restitution award based solely on 
evidence regarding its purchase price, there was no evidence here regarding at least 
one of the items for which the district court awarded restitution.  The district court’s 
restitution award included $1,500 for a “[g]old feather pin.”  (Resp. Br., p.14; R., p.96.)  
In its brief, the State asserts that Ms. Buck “testified that her late husband purchased  . . 
. the one-of-a-kind gold feather pin for $1,500.”  (Resp. Br., p.12.)  This is incorrect.  
Ms. Buck did not testify about the purchase price of the gold feather pin.  Her testimony 
at the restitution hearing was as follows: 
Q:  Now, do you have any idea how much your husband paid for [the 
ruby cabochon ring or the feather pin]? 
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A: The feather . . . was not included on the list I gave to you, and I 
have subsequently searched for it, and it is not there.  It was a very 
unique piece.  I am familiar with the piece. 
 
 The—I don’t know the price of it.  Since it was gold, it had to be in 
the hundreds of dollars, because it was obtained at a point in time 
when gold was a great deal less expensive than it is now.  The ring 
was—it cost at the time it was purchased in about the $1,500 
range. 
 
Q: Okay.  Now, back to the feather piece, did you say that was 
basically a one-of-a-kind piece— 
 
A: Yes, sir. 
 
Q: —it was handmade?  And you’re saying it was gold? 
 
A: Yes, sir. 
 
Q:  And were you able to take any steps to try to determine its value?  
Like, have you seen other pieces of jewelry like it? 
 
A: I searched for it through a lot of sites on the Internet.  It was made 
by an artist who typically makes these kinds of things.  Since I 
didn’t have it, I don’t recall the artist.  I have looked through receipts 
that we have.  I was not able to determine that. 
 
(11/13/15 Tr., p.8, L.14 – p.10, L.17.)  There is no evidence upon which the district court 




 For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in her opening brief, 
Ms. Nesbitt respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s restitution 
order and remand this case to the district court for entry of a restitution award of a 
scope and in amount that this Court determines to be appropriate based on the 
evidence in the record. 
 DATED this 6th day of September, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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